Research prototype. Synthetic data only. Not certified, not authorised, and not for any binding election. In India only the Election Commission of India or a State Election Commission can authorise a voting method.
ChunavIQ
An end-to-end verifiable, secret-ballot online election — built to show, with evidence anyone can re-check, what such a system can and cannot guarantee.
10,000-voter synthetic election
VERIFIED25 independent checks, 0 failures
6,837ballots from 10,000 eligible voters
9 / 9injected attacks rejected
5constituencies, counts equal ground truth
Final signed checkpoint root 3c8fcf9e1a1bef009046cdc51d48aaf3bf83216c505af1e3bfc7d8613bb5395f
What it guarantees
| Property | How |
|---|---|
| Only eligible voters, once each | Authenticated, blind-signed credential bound to one constituency; one ballot per credential |
| Secret ballot | 3-of-5 threshold encryption; individual ballots are never decrypted |
| Only valid ballots count | Zero-knowledge proofs: exactly one selection, NOTA included |
| Voters can check their ballot | Tracking code with Merkle inclusion proof; challenge to catch a lying device |
| Anyone can check the result | Append-only signed record, homomorphic tally, proven decryption, a verifier that shares no code with the election software |
What it does not solve
Coercion and vote-buying, a compromised voter device, denial of service, and credential minting by a dishonest eligibility authority. These are documented as open risks in the threat model — and are why this project does not recommend remote online voting for binding public elections.